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JURISDICTION AND THE "SITUS" OF DEBTS
Anglo-American courts early developed a body of rules strictly limit-
ing the jurisdiction of courts in cases where one party was a non-resi-
dent. These rules were based on the conception that jurisdiction to
affect the legal relations of the defendant depended upon physical
control over his person. Courts could not act unless the defendant had
been personally served within the jurisdiction.1 It was later recognized
'Buchanan, v. Rucker (18o8, K. B.) 9 East, 191; Schibsby v. Westenholz
(187o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 155; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714; Freeman v.
Alderson, (1886) 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165; McEwan, v. ZiMner (1878) 38
Mich. 765; Hildreth v. Thibodeaus (1904) 186 Mass. 83, 71 N. E. 11; D'Arcy v.
Kethum (185o, U. S.) ii How. 65 (judgment obtained against two partners,
[652] *
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by statute that when the non-resident owned physical objects located
within the state his right in such objects could be reached on substituted
service provided some reasonable method was adopted.2 The exercise
of jurisdiction by the courts where there is a "res" within the state
grew out of the idea that the state has control over all things within its
borders, and that it may be assumed that the defendant will keep in
touch with his property. Consequently, courts have hesitated to allow
substituted service where there is no physical thing within the state.
But a strict application of these rules often works hardship and it has
been found necessary to adapt the rules to the exigencies of the situa-
tion. A number of expedients have been resorted to in order to bring
this about. One of these-the introduction of a fiction of consent to
the exercise of jurisdiction-was recently discussed in the pages of
this journal.8 Another consists in discovering a "res" within the state
where none in fact exists. For this purpose legal relations are reified,
hypostatized, i. e. treated as if they were physical things within the state.
For example, in cases dealing with divorce the "matrimonial status" is
treated as a "res" over which the courts of the state in which one of the
parties is domiciled have jurisdiction.4 The slightest analysis reveals
one of whom was absent from the jurisdiciion and was not served with process,
is invalid and cannot be enforced against the absentee). ". . . it is not compe-
tent for a state court to render judgment in personam against a person who is
not a resident of the state, who does not appear in the suit, and who is not served
personally with process within the state." Morton, C. J., in Eliot v. McCormick
(1887) 144 Mass. Io, IO N. E. 705. A statute authorizing service by publication
in actions in personam when the defendant is not domiciled within the state is
unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution. See Pennoyer v. Neff,supra,
"... the state has jurisdiction over property'within its limits owned by non-
residents, and may, therefore, subject it to the payment of demands against
them of .its own citizens; and the inquiry can then Piroceed only so far as may
be necessary for the disposition of the property." Field, J., in Freeman v. Alder-
son, supra note i. They cannot determine any demand beyond that which is
satisfied by the property. Cooper v. Reynolds (i87o, U. S.) io Wall. 308. See
Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HARv. L. Rnv. 193,
283. As a result of the idea that equity acts only in personani courts have
hesitated to decree specific performance of a contract to convey land where the
defendant is absent from the jurisdiction. Silver Minink Co. v. Dickert (1904)
31 Mont. 488, 78 Pac. 967. But where there is a statute authorizing service by
publication in such cases, courts exercise jurisdiction, and hold that the action
is "quasi-in rem." Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts (191o) 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387
(bill to remove cloud on title) ; Telfair v. Telfair (18o4, S. C.) 2 Desauss. 271
(bill to obtain specific performance of a contract to convey land); Bush v.
Aldrich (iz8) II0 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922; Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co.-
(1893, C. C. N. D. Ohio) 55 Fed. 553.
'COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 415.
4 Courts seem to be agreed that a state can grant a divorce when one of the
parties is absent from the jurisdiction. See Atherton v. Atherton (19O1) 181
U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544. The only question is whether the decree is entitled
to recognition under the full faith and credit clause-of the Federal Constitution.
Haddock v. Haddock (igo6) 2Ol U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct 525 (decree granted in
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that if this'language is taken at its face value the logical fallacy of
hypostatization is committed. At most, the statement can be only a more
or less convenient mode of stating a result which has been reached on
grounds of social expediency, and not a reason for that result.
Greater difficulty arises when there is only a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. The belief of the courts that there must be a "res" within
the state, and the difficulty of saying that a debt is such a "res" and so
can have a "situs," has led to much confusion in the cases and to a
resulting tendency to reify the legal relations wherever the court has
decided to exercise jurisdiction.
Thus in the cases of garnishment or foreign attachment courts were
at first puzzled as to where the debt should be garnisheed. Some writers
take the view that the debtor should not be garnisheed unless his creditor
is also within the state, because the debt, being non-physical, can have
no "situs."5  The Supreme Court of the United States finally held,
however, that a debtor could be garnisheed wherever he could be found.6
The justification for permitting this would seem to be that the state
where the debtor is, is the only practical and convenient place to allow
garnishment if it is to be allowed at all. The result thus reached on
grounds of expediency may be and often is expressed by saying that
for garnishment purposes the "situs" of the debt is the state where
the debtor is. If we use this language we must then guard ourselves
state not the matrimonial domicile is not entitled to recognition in another state).
Perzel v. Perzel (i8gi) 91 Ky. 634, 15 S. W. 658; Burlen v. Shannon (1874)
115 Mass. 438 (decree granted in state in which plaintiff had a bonm fide domicile
is entitled to recognition in other states). See, Richards, Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce (ig2o) I5i
Ill, L. REv. 259 , NoTEs (1917) 31 HARV. L. Rtv. 489.
" It has been held that the "situs" of a debt for garnishment purposes is at the
domicile of the creditor. Green v. Farmers' and Citizens' Bank (1857) 25 Conn.
452; Ill. Central R. R. v. Smith (1893) 70 Miss. 344, 12 So. 461; Louisville &
Nashville R. R. v. Nash (i898) 11S Ala. 477, 23 So. 825; see, Central Trust Co.
of N. Y. v. Chattmooga R. & C. Ry. (895, C. C. E. D. Tena.) 68 Fed. 685;
Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in. Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913)
27 HARV. L. REv. 1O7. Some courts have said that it must be at the domicile of
the debtor. Newland v. Reilly (i89i) 85 Mich. 151, 48 N. W. 544; Bragg v.
Gaynor (1893) 85 Wis. 468.
'Harris v. Balk (19o4) 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (judgment is binding in
other states under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution if
notice has been sent the creditor). The case of Chicago, Rock Island Ry. v.
Sturin (1899) 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, shows the tendency to reify the legal
relations. The courts said: "Whatever of substance there is must be with the
debtor. He and he only has something in his hands. That something is the res,
and gives character to the action as one in the nature of a proceeding in ren."
Kansas City P. & G. Ry. v. Parker (19O1) 69 Ark. 401, 63 S. W. 996; Burlington
M. Ry. v. Thompson (1884) 31 Kan. i8o; NoTES (1923) 8 CORNI. L. QuART.
378; (1923) 2rMicH. L. REv. 938; COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LA W JiuRNAi,
877; Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration,
Garnishment, and Taxation (1918) 31 HAv. L. REv. 9o5; see NOEs (923)
37 HAxv. L. REv. 387.
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against reversing the proposition and saying that garnishment may be
had in the state of the debtor because that is the "situs" of the debt.'
The question has arisen whether jurisdiction will be exercised where
merely a debtor-creditor relationship is involved and there are two or
more persons each claiming to be the creditor, one of whom is a non-
resident and absent from the jurisdiction. As a result of the idea that
there must always be a "res" within the jurisdiction, courts have disa-
greed as to whether jurisdiction should be exercised, and the cases even
within one state are difficult to reconcile.8 In an action by the trustee of
an estate against a foreign insurance company authorized to do business
within the state, and several non-resident claimants, for the recovery
of the amount due on the insurance policy, the New York Court of
Appeals held that service by publication was sufficient as against the
non-resident claimants and therefore that they would be bound by the
court's adjudication of their legal relations. Here again the ostensible
reason for the decision was that "the action" was "one to deine and
enforce an interest in specific personal property within the state."
Thus the court found a "res" within the state. But in Schoenholz v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,'0 an interpleader proceeding involving a simi-
lar situation, the same court later refused to exercise jurisdiction as
there was no "res" within the state. The difficulty obviously arises
from the attempt of the court to find a "res" within the state and its
unwillingness to exercise jurisdiction unless such a "res" can be
discovered, coupled with the tendency to reify legal relations in order
to satisfy the supposed requirement.
That in the debtor-creditor cases there is in fact no "res" or thing
"Powell, Business Situs of Credits (1922) 28 W. VA. L. QUART. 89.
sThe problem of interpleader has been very fully discussed by Chafee, Inter-
state Interpleader (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 685. In Stevenson v. Anderson
(1814, Ch.) 2 Ves. & B. 4o7, Lord Eldon, holding that the resident plaintiff should
send notice to the absent claimants asking them to interplead, intimated that if
they did not do so they would be bound by the suit. The life insurance policy
cases have raised an interesting problem and courts are not entirely agreed as
to whether jurisdiction should be exercised where some of the claimants are
absent from the jurisdiction. Some American courts have not exercised jurisdic-
tion because no "res" could be found within the state. Cross v. Armstrong
(1887) 44 Ohio St. 613, io N. E. i6o; Hanna v. Stedinan (1921) 23o N. Y. 326,
13o N. E. 566; (1921) 3o YALE LAw JOURNAL, 86o; Schoenliolz v. New York
Life Ins. Co. (1921, ist Dept.) 197 App. Div. 91, 188 N: Y. Supp. 596; Dexter v.
Lichter (19o4) 24 App. D. C. 222; Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Looney (1913) I8o Ill.
App. 488; Gary v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Assoc. (1893) 87 Iowa, 25, 53
N. W. io86. But it has been held that interpleader should not be denied and
that the court has jurisdiction. Perry v. Young (1913) 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. W.
577; NoT s (1916) 16 CoL. L. REV. 414; COMMENTS (1916) 27 YA. LAW
JOURNAL, 252; Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. (igo8) 74 N. J. Eq. 197,
71 Atl. 6o5; Kelly v. Smith (1912, C. C. A. 7th) 196 Fed. 466.
Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (i9o7) 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438.
" Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 8; COMMENTS (1922) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 425; NOTES (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 152.
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within the state is emphasized by the decisions which assert that usually
for taxation purposes the "situs" of the debt is the domicile of the
creditor."" On the other hand, for the purposes of administration the
"situs" of the debt is held to be at the domicile of the debtor.12  As
has been well said by Prof. T. R. Powell, "situs" really is only a "tag
for a result" and should be taken "as a verbal sign for the place where
a debt or chose in action may be effectively dealt with" for the particu-
lar purpose in view. If this is kept in mind it would seem that the test
should be whether, from a practical standpoint, the exercise or non-
exercise of jurisdiction in the particular case works substantial justice
to the parties, all things considered.'3 Arguments have been advanced
by some writers' against the advisability of allowing the courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction in interpleader cases, as well as in garnishment cases,
where one or more parties are non-residents, and absent from the juris-
diction. The opportunity for fraud thus afforded to persons having
unfounded claims is one of the most important objections. Another
is the injustice to the non-resident defendant in being required to travel
a great distance to defend a claim and the probability that he will suffer
judgment by default rather than go to so great an expense to defend.
It has also been advanced that in garnishment cases it is unfair to the
non-resident to permit service by publication wherever the garnishee
can be found because his creditor cannot know where the garnishee is
at all times.' 4
Against these considerations must be placed the injustice that would
often result to the plaintiff in a given case if he can never determine
his legal relations until all of the parties are within one jurisdiction.
Because of this injustice the Supreme Court of the United States, as
has been pointed out, ifi the garnishment cases, has held that the debtor
may be garnisheed wherever he may be found regardless of whether his
creditor is within the state. It has been argued that this should be
considered an exception to the normal rule and strictly limited. There
seems to be no substantial reason why in cases where a similar injustice
would result the court should not, after taking into account all the
a' A creditor may be taxed at the state of his domicile on all debts due him.
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 3oo; Scripps v. Board
of Review of Fulton County (i89g) 183 Ill. 278, 55 N. E. 70o ("the debt follows
the residence of the creditor and has its situs there") ; see Beale, Jurisdiction to
Tax (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 587. See also NoTEs (1918) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 117
(situs of stock for purpose of taxation) ; Beale, Taxation of Foreign Corpora-
tions (19o3) 17 I-Iv. L. Rlv. 248; Powell, Business Situs of Credits, supra
note 7.
'Barrett v. Barrett's Adm'r (1916) 17o Ky. 91, 185 S. W. 499. See Beale,
Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, supra note 5; ,Carpenter,
Jurisdiction over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnislment, and
Taxation, supra note 6.
' Powell, Business Situs of Credits, supra note 7.
"
4Beale, Jurisdiction in Rem to Compdl Payment of a Debt, supra note 5
at p. 121.
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advantages and disadvantages and balancing the considerations, assume
jurisdiction if it sees fit to do so. In the recent case of Redzina v.
Provident Inst. for Savings in Jersey City, 5 however, the.court was
influenced by the old notion that jurisdiction depends upon physical
control or the presence of a "res" within the state. In that case a
husband and wife had opened a joint saving account. No money
could be drawn from the bank unless the pass book was presented.
Later the wife disappeared and the pass book could not be found. The
plaintiff, husband, upon refusal of the bank to pay the money to him,
brought a bill to force the defendant bank to do so. The wife was
served by publication as provided by statute. The court held that there
was no "res" within the state and therefore service by publication was
unconstitutional and the court had no jurisdiction. The conclusion of
the court was that service by publication is based upon the assumption
that owners of property keep in touch with wvhat is published where it is
situated and that it would be unfair to require the non-resident to follow
the whereabouts of the debtor. Although this might be true in some
cases, in the instant case the debtor is a savings bank permanently
located within the state, and is unlikely to leave the state. It should
also be noted that the instant case differs from the interpleader cases
in that both parties have a valid claim to the money and either is entitled
to the whole amount. Moreover, in view of the fact that it has been
held that the bank may waive the requirement that the pass book be
presented and so may pay the whole to one party thus extinguishing
the claim against it, 6 it would seem that the court might well have exer-
cised jurisdiction in the instant case. The unfortunate result reached
seems to be that the plaintiff may never be able to recover his money.
The possible injustice that might result to a non-resident claimant if
jurisdiction were permitted in such a case as this would seem to be more
than offset by the injustice which results to the plaintiff upon refusal to
exercise jurisdiction.
THE RIGHTS OF NON-CUMULATIVE PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS IN
UNDIVIDED PROFITS
It has been usual for the courts to say that the holder of non-cumu-
lative preferred corporate stock loses with the close of each fiscal period
all interest in profits that have accrued but remain undivided during
such period.- It is well settled that division of profits is a matter for
(1924, N. J. Eq.) 125 At. 133.
"
8 Brooks v. Erie County Savings Bank (1915, 4th Dept.) 169 App. Div. 73, 154
N. Y. Supp. 69?. By-law requiring presentation of pass book must be construed
reasonably. Mills v. Albany Exch. Sas. Bank (1899, Sup. Ct. Tr. T.) 28 Misc.
251, 59 N. Y. Supp. 149.
'Burke v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co. (1912) 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857; Hazel-
tine v. B. & M. L. Ry. (1887) 79 Me. 411, 42o, io Atl. 328, 332. See also I Cook,
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the discretion of the directors and that a court will compel a declaration
of dividends only when such discretion is exercised in bad faith.2 On
the face of it, a contract in which the promisee's rights are conditional
upon the accrual of profits in such an amount as in sound business
judgment warrants division is not an unreasonable contract; but let
us see how such a'contract will actually work out in the business world
and what the courts, faced by its working, have actually done as dis-
tinguished from what they have said.
The buyer of preferred stock is ordinarily a mere investor. The
courts applying legal criteria, and the general public, thinking in terms
of an economics worked out in the infancy of industrialism, and misled
by the label "shareholder," have been accustomed to regard him as
what the economists would call a co-entrepreneur. That he is not such
in any real sense seems abundantly clear. Functionally considered
from the point of view of the buyer, preferred stock is a device for
getting a higher return on capital than can be obtained by investing
in bonds, while at the same time retaining as much as possible of the
bondholder's security. In construing the contract the preferred stock-
holder makes, this fact must be constantly borne in mind. The cir-
cumstances attendant upon its issue further- evidence the true nature of
preferred stock: it is issued by "going concerns" to finance contem-
plated expansions or to raise money to tide over difficult periods; it is
issued upon reorganization of insolvent corporations in exchange for
outstanding bonds; it is sold to the investing public in the promotion
of new enterprises. In all these cases the preferred stock may be, and
frequently is, issued voteless and with the privilege and power of
retirement by the corporation.3 Such provisions, it seems, make the
economic function of preferred stock perfectly clear.
The entrepreneur of the classical economists, uniting in himself the
functions of promotion, control, management, and ownership, is no
longer typical. The real work of promotion is now generally carried off
by specialists-brokers and underwriting banks-in the employ of the
Corporations (8th ed. 1923) 920: "... the courts are inclined to scan closely a
refusal to declare dividends where there are net profits and where the preferred
stock is non-cumulative." Likewise a similar statement in I Morawetz, Private
Corporations (2d ed. 1886) sec. 459. The rationale of these statements seems
clear.
'St. John, v. Erie Ry. (1874, U. S.) 22 Wall. 136; N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry. v.
Nickals (1886) iig U. S. --96, 7 Sup. Ct. 2o9; Storrow v. Texas Consolidated
Compress & Mfg. Assoc. (1898, C. C. A. 5th) 87 Fed. 612.
'Under the avowed rule it would seem that where such privilege is provided
for, the stock might under some circumstances, when non-cumulative, be retired
without the shareholder having received any return at all on his money although
the corporation might have profited greatly from the use thereof-as where after
a long period in which dividends are omitted in order to build up -a working
capital res&ve, a "bumper" year enables the corporation to retire the preferred
stock. But whatever the rule avowed by a court, it seems certain that it would
find some pretext for protecting a plaintiff in such circumstances.
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element which, for the present purpose, may be termed the "control-
ler"4 of the corporation. It is the "controller," also, who, at a later
stage of the enterprise, employs the laborers and the managers and it is
he who hires the capital-hires persons to own the enterprise. Func-
tionally considered from his point of view, preferred stock is often
merely a device for separating more effectually the control of the enter-
prise from its ownership while giving as little as possible of the bond-
holder's security. Whether or not the preferred stock is voteless, the
C'controller" will always be careful to retain in his hands enough
common stock to control the enterprise. Such common stock is theoreti-
cally not "water," but in practice it is likely to be so in part; for the
"controller" will take for his services in organizing the corporation as
much as can possibly be taken within the requirement of "good faith."
As the enterprise gets under way, any "water" that may exist is
gradually absorbed by the accrual of profits that remain undivided, by
the upbuilding of "good will," and by the increasing capital value of
the organization as a "going concern." But whether there is originally
any "water" or not, it is manifestly to the interest of the "cbntroller"
as owner of at least fifty-one per cent. of the common stock to extin-
guish the interest of non-cumulative shareholders in accruing profits.
Frequently his only objective for the enterprise is so to manipulate it as
to raise the market value of his shares to a point at which he can sell out
at a handsome profit; and the sooner this point is reached, the sooner he
can step out to repeat the process with another enterprise.
The non-cumulative shareholder, voteless or outvoted, with only the
flimsy protection of the legal requirement of "good faith ' 5 between
"The "controller" is fifty-one per cent of the common, or voting stock He
may be an individual or a group, the members of which are in agreement between
themselves as to the policy to be pursued. The "controller" may have retained
control at the time of organization or he may have bought control in the open
market or the control element may have "crystallized" out of the corporate mem-
bership; but in any case the "controller" is pretty certain to emerge as a well-
defined unit in the economic process-a unit with power concentrated in his hands
and with interest, in so far as the division of economic income is concerned,
adverse to all the other elements in that process including capital. In the face
of this phenomenon the classical economic theory as to the tripartite competitive
division of income into rent, wages, and profits breaks down. The inadequacy
of the classical theories to describe present-day economic phenomena is discussed
in Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times (1923)
passim.
'The difficulties of proving "bad faith" are notorious. And it seems that it
cannot exist as long as the retention of profits can be shown to be in the best
interest of the corporation. Even extensive expansions at the expense of the
non-cumulative shareholder are consistent with "good faith" although under the
avowed rule it would seem that the only possibility of gain therefrom for him
is in the greater probability that dividends will be earned in future years, which
dividends, however, may never be declared. St. John v. Erie Ry., supra note 2.
Another case permits only those expansions demanded by the public interest.
Burke v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co., supra note i.
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him and the adverse interest of the "controller," is practically at the
latter's mercy if he has no. permanent rights in accruing profits. It is
quite conceivable that sound business policy might compel the "control-
ler" of a corporation to withhold accruing profits from division for a
score of years and it seems clear that the law should accord him the
privilege of so doing;6 but it seems equally clear that sound public policy
demands that the "controller" shall'not be in a position by the exercise
of that privilege to profit at the expense of the non-cumulative share-
holder. And policy apart, it is unreasonable that such should be the
result of the exercise of the privilege. Not, it may be urged, if the
non-cumulative shareholder contracted on those terms. But waiving the
objection that such an argument begs the question, it cannot be denied
that such shareholders contract for some sort of preference over the
common stodkholders by the express terms of their contract. To hold
that withholding division of accrued profits divests their interest in
such profits is to make their preference illusory-to accord the real
preference to the common stockholders, and so, to the "controller";
for, assuming that the privilege of withholding will be exercised, as it
will, realistically viewed, the avowed rule gives the common stock a
preference over the preferred to the amount that may be withheld in
"good faith." Hence it is that the construction that the courts have
said they put upon the non-cumulative shareholder's contract is essen-
tially unreasonable.
The problem presented to the courts in determining the rights of
non-cumulative shareholders in undivided profits is, as in so many
modern cases, essentially one of preserving a proper balance between
the various elements in the economic process in their competition for
income.7 There seems to be not a single case directly establishing the
existence of the avowed rule. The nearest approach to an authority
for this rule is found in those cases in which the courts have used the
rule as a premise from which to deduce the existence in the shareholder
of a right, regardless of the existence of "bad faith," to compel divi-
sion of accruing profits.8 But these cases seem to be unsound as
' Of course control sometimes falls into the hands of those ignorant or careless
of the needs of the enterprise; but the requirement Of "good faith," being an
objective one, is supposed to take care of such exigencies.
'The question is not as to whether the "controller" performs a really valuable
service in the economic process: That his service may be of the utmost value
will be conceded. The real problem is to prevent the "controller," with power
concentrated in his hands, from getting more than his fair share of economic
income.
S Burke v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co., supra note i; Hazeltine v. B. & M. Ry.,
supro note i. In the latter case it was held that there was a forthright promise
to divide all profits semi-annually; but though the right to dividends was not
made expressly conditional upon declaration by the board of directors, it would
seem that in accordance with sound policy such a condition should always be
implied although in the Hazeltine case such a condition would, seemingly, not
have affected the result.
66o -
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encroachments on the discretion of the directors ("controller") in the
control of the enterprise. Generally, however, this discretion is upheld
and suits to compel division denied.9 Such cases are silent as to the
possibility of non-cumulative shareholders having continuing equitable
rights in the withheld profits. If such rights were generally recognized,
no encroachment upon the discretion of the board of directors would be
necessary. There are a few cases recognizing such rights; but in all
of them there is more or less reliance on some special provision of
charter or statute as determinative of the result,10 although the provi-
sions relied upon in some cases are of such doubtful meaning as to raise
the suspicion that the same rights would have been recognized in their
absence.
Two recent New Jersey cases are the latest to recognize such rights in
non-cumulative shareholders. The defendant corporation in these cases
had in previous years earned profits sufficient for dividends on both
non-cumulative preferred and common stock, but the funds so earned
had been withheld and transferred to a "working capital reserve fund."
In 1922, after having paid on the non-cumulative* stock the preference
dividend of seven per cent., the board of directors voted to pay thereon
an additional dividend of one-half of one per cent. and a dividend of
the same per cent. on the common stock, in each case reciting that the
dividend so declared was paid from funds accumulated by withholding
past earned but undivided profits from the particular class of stock-
9Supra note 2.
0In Wood v. Lary (i888, N. Y. Sup.' Ct. App. T.) 47 Hun, 55o, a common
stockholder sued to enjoin a "lump" payment to non-cumulative stockholders of
four years' dividends where profits sufficient to pay the omitted dividends had
accrued in the corresponding years. The injunctipn was denied. The court, rely-
ing on the charter (". . . entitled to dividends . . . not cumulative ... whenever
in any year the net earnings, after payment of all interest charges, shall suffice
for the payment thereof") regarded the language as a forthright promise to
divide. semi-annually; but the decision turns on the force of the word "suffice"
and clearly the court might have found in this word an implied condition of
sufficiency in accord with sound business policy. In Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron
P. & F. Co. (909) 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 514, a common stockholder sued to
restrain payment of a dividend to the non-cumulative preferred stockholders
from moneys accumulated in past years by withholding profits from such stock-
holders on the ground that all undistributed profits "belonged" to common stock-
holders after the close of each fiscal period. The injunction was refused, but
despite the contention of the corporation that it might use any and all surplus
net profits to pay preferred dividends, the court said that only moneys accumu-
lated by withholding profits from preferred stockholders might be so used. The
position taken by the court is noteworthy in view of the charter provision that
' . . the preferred stock shall be entitled out of any and all surplus net profits,
whenever declared by the board of directors, to non-cumulative dividends . ..
In Continental Insurance Co. v. M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. (1922, D. M mnn.)
283 Fed. 276, affd. (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 290 Fed. 87, affd. (1923) 263 U. S. 7o3,
44 Sup. Ct. 33, accrued but undivided profits were held, in accordance with stock
certificate and consolidation articles to be eai-marked for the shareholders who
would have received dividends, had the profits been divided.
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holders then being paid. In Moran v. United States Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Co.,11 a common stock holder, while conceding that under the
doctrine of a previous New Jersey case' 2 moneys accumulated by with-
holding division of accrued profits could be used subsequently to pay
dividends only on that stock from which such profits had in the first
instance been withheld, nevertheless sought to restrain payment of the
additional dividend to the preferred stockholders .on the ground that the
charter provisions prohibited payment to such stockholders of anything
beyond their seven per "cent. preference in any one year. In other
words, it was urged in limitation of the former decision, that under it
profits withheld from the preferred stockholders were available subse-
quently only for making up deficiencies in "lean" years in the seven
per cent. preference. The injunction was denied by the vice-chancellor
in an able opinion in which, at the same time, he granted an injunction
to a preferred stockholder who had sued to enjoin any payment at all
to common stockholders until all profits withheld in previous years
from preferred stockholders had first been declared and distributed to
them. In the Court of Errors and Appeals, the first decision- was
unanimously affirmed' 3 on the vice-chancellor's opinion, but only an
equal division of the Court saved the latter decision from reversal in
Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co.'4 The judges
voting for affirmance relied on the statute 5 as controlling, but the other
members of the court reached their result in spite of it-a fact which, in
view of the statutory provisions, is striking evidence of the strength of
the belief in the supposed rule.
It seems clear from the foregoing not only that what has usually
been regarded as the rule is unsound as being out of touch with the
realities of modern business, but also that it is totally unsupported by
authorities. The failure of the courts up to now frankly to avow what
seems to be the real rule is to be explained, it is believed, in part by the
'persistence of the notion that shareholders are necessarily co-entre-
preneurs. This we have seen is fallacious. The other obstacle ih the
way of recognition of the real rule is believed to be this, that the word
"non-cumulative" has been commonly taken as a negation of all that the
word "cumulative" stands for without analyzing just how such a nega-
tion operates.
It is said that a corporation holds its property in trust for the indivi-
"(1924) 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546.
"Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron P. & F. Co. supra note io.
"(1924, N. J. Eq.) 126 Atl. 329.
14 (1924, N. J. Eq.) 126 AtI. 302.
"The statute provided: ". . . the holders thereof shall be entitled to receive,
and the corporation shall be bound to pay thereon, a fixed yearly dividend, to be
expressed in the certificate, not exceeding eight per centum, payable quarterly,
half-yearly, or yearly, before any dividend shall be set apart or -paid on the
common stock and such dividends may be -made cumulative ..."
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dual shareholders. 6 In accordance with this statement and in descrip-
tion of shareholders' rights in undivided profits as recognized in the
decided cases, it seems proper to say that accruing profits come into
the hands of the corporation impressed with a trust in favor of the
shareholders who would be entitled to receive them, were they then
divided. The norm is the corporation with only one class of share-
holders. In such a concern the stockholders take their equitable inter-
ests in accruing profits in proportion to their holdings. Before the
accrual of such profits the stockholder has merely an expectant interest
analogous to the expectancies of the law of real property. After their
accrual he is the beneficiary of a trust, whose res is the undivided profits
and whose terms are settled by the law of corporations and the contract
between the parties. The expectant interest of the common stockholder,
as the norm, is that given by the law as an incident of the shareholder
relationship when the nature of the expectant interest of the share-
holder is not the subject of express contract. To designate shares as
"preferred," "cumulative," "non-cumulative," and so on is to contract
expressly as to the nature of this expectant interest in profits not yet in
esse. The cumulative preferred stockholder has during the first year
an expectant interest in that fraction of the first year's profits which
equals the promised per centum of his holdings-say seven per cent.
If profits are earned, this expectant interest becomes actual and imme-
diate;17 if not, it continues merely expectant, and during the second
year such stockholder will have an expectant interest in the second
year's profits equal to fourteen per cent. of his holdings; and if in the
second year there are likewise no profits, then in the third year he will
have an expectant interest equal to twenty-one per cent., and so on. In
other words, his expectant interests for the various years accumulate,
when they are not realized, and it should be noted that, although they
are realized as actual and immediate equitable interests in undivided
profits, these -latter relapse to mere expectant interests if the profits-
the subject matter of the equitable interest-are lost through the chances
of the enterprise, and continue as such until again realized. The
expectant interest of non-cumulative shareholders differs from that of
the cumulative shareholder only in this, that the expectant interests of
i Morawetz, op. cit. sec. 237. Of course this is merely a conveniently abbre-
viated way of describing a complicated species of ownership of property to which
individuals sometimes find it expedient to resort. See Hohfeld, Nature of Stock-
holders" Individual Liability for Corporation Debts (igog) 9 Co. L. REV. 285.
I' Not, of course, in the sense that there is an immediate, unconditional right
that the corporation shall pay him dividends. See supra note 2 and correspondent
text. The interest "expected" was the beneficial "end" of a trust relationship
with the corporation the trustee. With the accrual of profits-the coming into
existence of the trust res-all those legal relations which go to make up that jural
aggregate we call a trust become immediately enforceable. For an -able and
detailed discussion of the relations going to make up this aggregate in the case
of the non-cumulative shareholder, see Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock
(1923) 23 COb. L. REV. 358.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the former for the various years never accumulate: they must be
realized, if at all, out of profits for the corresponding years.'
It thus appears that a preference, in its relational- aspect, is an expec-
tant equitable interest in profits not yet in esse, variant from the normal
in a manner expressly provided by the terms of the contract between the
parties ;19 and the particular variation from the normal denoted by the
word "cumulative" is that in which the expectant equitable interests
for the various years accumulate as described above. It is this accu-
mulation of expectant interests (or preferences) that is negatived by the
word "non-cumulative."2 0  But because the "right to afrearages" for
"' The statement~that the non-cumulative shareholder's expectant interests for
the various years cannot accumulate-that they must be "realized" out of profits
for the corresponding years-obviously precludes the reappearance of such
expectant interests, as in the case of cumulative stock, upon the loss of withheld
profits through the chances of the enterprise.
"' A common variant from the normal mode of taking equitable interests in accru-
ing profits is that of giving preferred stockholders the "right" (really an expect-
ant interest) to participate in profits equally with common stockholders after
the preference dividend has been paid to the former, or provided for, and after
a dividend of the same per cent. has been paid to the common stockholders, or
provided for. It seems clear that wherever the "right" to participation exists,
the common stockholder has a secondary preference equal in per centum to the
primary preference of the preferred stockholder, and after the latter has been
paid his preference or after it has been provided for, the common stockholder,
as to his secondary preference to further profits, is in the position of the ordinary
non-cumulative preferred stockholder as to first profits. This seems to have been
recognized on the ground of express charter provision in Continental Insurance
Co. v. M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., supra note 1o; and see Bassett v. U. S. Cast
Iron P. & F. Co., supra note 1o. In.several cases denying cumulative rights to
such common stockholders, the insistence of the court that the dividends sued
for had neither been earned nor declared seems to indicate that non-cumulative
rights were recognized. Englander v. Osborne (1918) 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614;
Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co. (1924, 4th Dept.) 21o App. Div. 141, 205
N. Y. Supp. 51. Some courts hold the right to participation exists in all pre-
ferred stockholders unless explicitly negatived by contract. Sternbergh v. Brock
(i9o9) 225 Pa. 279, 74 At. 166; contra: Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co. (1912,
S. D. N. Y.) 196 Fed. 994, affd. (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 2o2 Fed. 141.
"Despite the fact that the contract is often expressed by saying that the pre-
ferred stock shall be entitled to "cumulative dividends" or "non-cumulative divi-
dends," it is nevertheless maintained that these adjectives have no proper reference
to the "accumulation of dividends" but only to the accumulation of preferences
or expectant interests. Much of the uncertainty in the law of non-cumulative
stock has no doubt been the result of such loose forms of expression. See the
language of the New Jersey statute, supra note 15. If these adjectives do have
proper reference to the "accumulation of dividends," then without explicitly
contracting for it every common stockholder gets this "right to receive" back-
profits which the non-cumulative preferred stockholder does not. This is an
unreasonable result for the "right to receive" back-profits makes the probability
of income higher for the common than for the preferred stockholders, whereas
it is generally understood that the preferred stockholder foregoes the "right to
vote" and usually the "right to participation" in return for greater assurance of
a stipulated return.
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all years is the most striking of the relations 21 making up the cumulative
shareholder's interest, it has been easy to reason that where "cumula-
tive rights" are negatived there can be no "right to arrearages" at all.
But this is manifestly erroneous-if "right to arrearages" means only
the "right to receive" dividends earned in one year in another year
subsequent thereto, or a "right to receive" several years' profits in
a "lump" dividend-for even a common stockholder may receive
"lump" dividends and yet it is never objected that he is then getting
"cumulative rights." Payment to non-cumulative stockholders of
arrearages made up. of past earned but undivided profits no more
involves a recognition of "cumulative rights" in such shareholders
than does the payment of "lump" dividends to common stockholders.
Yet the proposition that non-cumulative dividends, once passed, are
forever lost is repeatedly encountered in the cases either in express
form or as an "inarticulate major premise." Manifestly the
logic is at fault; but it seems clear that the persistent belief that
this rule exists is to be ascribed very largely to a faulty analysis of the
negation contained in the world"non-cumulative." TheNewJersey cases,
discussed above, are unquestionably sound, but it does seem unfortunate
that there was in them any reliance on charter or statute. The law of
non-cumulative stock needs the clarifying effect of a few decisions "on
principle." Even in the absence of a pertinent statute the most explicit
sort of language should be required in the charter, by-laws, or stock
certificate to negative the existence in the non-cumulative shareholder
of equitable rights in undivided profits to the extent of his preference.
It is even doubtful that sound public policy should ever permit a cor-
poration to make a contract denying them. 22
MODERN VIEWS OF THE ELECTION OF !REMEDIES
Because of its harsh operation the doctrine of election of remedies
(that resort to one remedy bars later resort to one inconsistent with it)
has received much unfavorable notice in recent years.' In many cases
'The "right to arrearages" is, of course, a jural aggregate; not a simple
legal relation.
" In this connection it is worthy of careful notice that despite the explicit
charter provisions to the contrary, the court in the Bassett case, supra note io,
denied the "right" of the preferred stockholders to receive dividends -"out of any
and all surplus net profits" and recognized the equitable interest of the common
stockholders in all moneys accumulated by withholding from them dividends in
former years.
'See Hine, Election of Remedies, a Criticism (1913) 26 HAIv. L. REv. 707;
Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MINN, L. REV. 341, 480.,
"No matter what may be thought of the merit of the doctrine of election of
remedies, it is a long observed and deeply intrenched rule of procedure. But,
for obvious reasons, it has never been a favorite of equity . . . At best this
doctrine of election of remedies is a harsh and now largely obsolete rule, the
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the rule prevents an injured but ill-advised plaintiff from recovering
against an admittedly guilty but well-advised defendant.
2  Under
modern codes 6f procedure the doctrine is anomalous; forms of action
have been abolished and a plaintiff now receives whatever relief he can
show a right to, no matter how inconsistent his pleadings.
2 While
some code states have struggled to abandon the doctrine as antiquated,
others uphold it as a fundamental principle of practice.
4 The recent
case of Frederickson v. Nye (1924) iio Ohio. St. 484, 144 N. E. 5 299,
shows that the Supreme Court of Ohio, though making an effort to
avoid the highly technical results reached in its earlier decisions, is still
committed to the election of remedies as a rule of code pleading. It is
believed that an examination of the case will indicate that the plaintiffs
had done no act which properly constituted an election, and that even
assuming such an act the remedies sought by them were not under the
code so inconsistent as to justify denial of recovery.
Six months before the commencement of the present suit the plaintiffs
had brought an action for damages alleging the same facts, with an
averment that the property in dispute belonged to the defendants. On
giving an injunction bond they obtained in that action an order restrain-
ing the defendants from disposing of the property. Their motion for
a receiver was denied. Four months later, under the provisions of the
Ohio General Code," they dismissed their damage suit without prejudice
at their costs. The injunction was then dissolved. Shortly thereafter
the defendants conveyed the property to Frederickson, who, it was
scope of which should not be extended . . . ." Clarke, J., in Friedrichsen v.
Renard (1918) 247 U. S. 207, 211, 213, 38 Sup. Ct. 450, 451, 452, cited with
approval by Beach, J., in Abbadessa v. Puglisi (1924, Conn.) 124 AtI. 838.
"Finality is now accorded to election with marked hesitation in contradistinc-
tion to the view which obtained at the time of the decision in Terry v. Munger,
121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E.* 272-" Bijur, J., in Bank of United States v. Nat. City
Bank of New York (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 8oi, 2o6 N. Y. Supp.
428. See also Andrews, J., in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co. (I92I)
230 N. Y. 285, 13o N. E. 295.
'"We believe that a court of equity cannot award damages in the face of the
generally accepted doctrine that one who elects one of two inconsistent remedies
must stand or fall by his decision. . . We regret the position we are thus obliged
to take, especially in view of the fact as has already been heretofore indicated,
the defendants have been guilty of an act of fraud criminal in its nature."
Muteller v. Michels (1924, Wis.) 197 N. W. 201, 2o6. "It is proper to observe
that in a case where fraud is proved, it will not do for the court to pursue the
shadow and refuse to take note of the substance." Dean, J., in Carson v. Greeley
(1922) l07 Neb. 6o9, 62o, 187 N. W. 47, 51.
'See Clark, Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 CoL L. REv. I.
"'Although the whole genius of code pleading would seem to oppose the
retention of a rule founded in outworn formul . . .we find the curious rule
perpetuated in many decisions under the codes." Deinard and Deinard, op. cit.




claimed, had knowledge of the fraud of his grantors. The plaintiffs
then brought the present action, seeking to establish a trust in their
favor against the original defendants and Frederickson. 7  On appeal
to the Supreme Court it was held that the first suit was an action at
law in deceit, and the second a suit in equity; that the first was on the
theory that the legal title was in the defendants, and the second on the
theory that though the legal title was in the defendants, the equitable
title was in the plaintiffs. Two such actions, said the court, are incon-
sistent. The plaintiffs were then held to have elected their remedy as
against the original defendants because the injunction secured in the
first action was detrimental to the defendants. Final judgment was
given for Frederickson, who, since he stood in his grantors' shoes, could
avail himself of the election.
In the years when Terry v. Mungers held the field, this decision would
have been considered very advanced, for it goes far beyond the views
prevailing in that era. It asserts, and in so doing substantially overrules
earlier Ohio cases,9 that merely beginning a suit is not such a decisive
act as to constitute an election. 10 It adopts instead the rapidly growing
ru~le that the party making the election must have caused detriment or
loss to the other party or received some benefit under it," or pursued
his remedy to final judgment.12  The court does not in terms accept
the most modern view, that an election to be binding must be an estoppel
either in pais or of record. 1' Nevertheless the only element of estoppel
lacking in its requirements is misleading conduct, which might often
" The trial court gave judgment on the pleadings for the defendants. In the
Court of Appeals the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings was
overruled as to Frederickson, but sustained in favor of his grantors. The
plaintiffs were awarded damages and the judgment has made a lien on the
property. Both the plaintiffs and Frederickson appealed.
'Supra note i.
'Lee v. Thoma (1915) 91 Ohio St. 444, iO N. E. lO62; Mignery v. Olin-
stead, Adn'r (1915) 91 Ohio St. 416, Iio N. E. lO63; Drake v. Zutterling (igo)
82 Ohio St 410, 92 N. E. 1113 (all memoranda decisions). The court approves
Becker v. Walworth (1887) 45 Ohio St 169, 12 N. E. i.
'Beginning suit was held an election in Belding v. Whittington (1922) 154
Ark. 561, 243 S. W. 8o8; Ireland v. Waymire (192o) 1O7 Kan. 384, 191 Pac.
304; contra: Sauer v. Bradley (1922) 87 Okla. 277, 21o Pac. 726; Tracy v.
Aldrich (1921, Mo.) 236 S. W. 347.
'Knowles v. Dark & Boswell (1924, Ala.) 99 So. 312; Bell v. Butte Inv. Co.
(1923, Mo.) 250 S. W. 381.
"C. M. Davis & Co. v. Stakes (1923) 122 S. C. 539, 115 S. E. 814; Berman
v. Apter (192o) 95 Conn. 66, iO AUt. 453.
" Roullard v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. (1924, Calif.) 224 Pac. 449,451 ; Huff man.
v. Bankers' Automobile Ins. Co. (1924, Neb.) 199 N. W. 716; srutcher v. Rave
(1924, Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S. W. 970. But see Pederson v. Christopherson (i9o6)
97 Minn. 491, io6*N. W. 958. "Indeed it is probable that some element either of
ratification or of estoppel is at the root of most cases, if not all, in which an
election of remedies, once made, is viewed as a finality." Cardozo, J., in Schenck
v. State Lhw Tel. Co. (1924) 238 N. Y. 308, 312, 144 N. E. 592, 593.
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be implied. As Professor Hine has pointed out,14 the estoppel theory
which seems to mean, simply, that the plaintiff's later resort to an
inconsistent remedy must not be so unfair to the defendant as to amount
to a fraud on him, breaks down the doctrine of election by depriving it
of an excuse for a separate existence -in our law. The doctrine is
further broken down by a restriction on the court's statement regarding
election by judgment: it is now generally held that a judgment that the
plaintiff has not the remedy he seeks is not an election.1 5 If the judg-
ment is that the plaintiff has mistaken his rights, he may seek an incon-
sistent remedy. With these two qualifications, the rule announced in
this decision is a fairly modern one. It is submitted, however, that a
proper application of it to the facts of the present case would have
produced a different result.
Taking the rule at its face value, we must find loss to the defendants
or gain by the plaintiffs. The court found this in the temporary injunc-
tion restraining the defendants from disposing of the property. The
opinion reads, "To deprive one of the free control of his property and
the right to alien or incumber the same is to deprive him of a substan-
tial right."' 6  The answer would seem to be threefold. i. The defen-
dants were fully protected by their injunction bond. The purpose of
the bond was to save them harmless. Should they be able to prevent
any enforcement of the plaintiffs' rights on the ground of some proble-
matical loss when the law had already fully protected them against any
loss which it would recognize? 2. The defendants, if they suffered
any loss in this case, suffered it as a result of their own fraud. Should
they be heard to complain if their unsocial conduct caused them tempo-
rary inconvenience? In McMahan v. McMahon17 the defendant urged
in bar of a suit for breach of contract that he had been prevented for
five months from disposing of his property by the plaintiff's earlier
suit for specific performance of the same contract. The court held
the defendant had nobody but himself to blame, saying, "Is the plaintiff
to be penalized for that condition of affairs rather than the defendant,
who brought it about by violating a valid contract?" 3. Recent cases
in many jurisdictions show that as long as statutes allowing dismissal
without prejudice exist, the loss pleaded by the defendant must be some-
thing more than an inconvenience or expense normally incidental to the
defense of an earlier suit.'8 To hold otherwise is on such facts as these
1 4 Op. cit. supra note i, at p. 7o8.
"Jadwin v. Hoyt (1924, C. C. A. 7th) i Fed. (2d) 784; Schenck v. State
'Line Tel. Co. supra note 13; and see Gunderson, v. Halvorson (igi8) i4o Minn.
292, 168 N. W. 8; Palmer v. Bizzell (i92i, Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 971.
16At p. 499, i44 N. E. 304.
.T (1922) 122 S. C. 336, 115 S. E. 293.
' Carson v. Greeley, supra note 2 (in "rescission suit later dismissed the plain-
tiff restrained the defendant from disposing of the property; more than a year
later she sued for damages on the same facts) ; Brown v. Ball (i919) 43 N. D.
314, 174 N. W. 629 (defendant arrested in earlier suit and forced to stand
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to nullify those statutes. In this case the provisional injunction may
not have been essential to the plaintiff's action for damages, but it
certainly was normally incidental to it, and we should probably think the
plaintiffs ill-advised if they had not applied for a restraining order. If
they had not applied for it, but had merely subjected the defendants to
costs beyond the taxable amouht, the Ohio court would have seen no
loss on the defendants' part. How can we draw the line between these
two types of inconvenience, both incidental -to the defense of such an
action as this?
There seems to be little reason, then, for decidifig that the original
defendants had suffered such detriment that the plaintiffs had elected
their remedy against them. Nor is there more reason for discovering
an election against Frederickson, their grantee. He has sustained no
loss. The plaintiffs have wrested no advantage from him. He did not
come into the case until the injunction against his grantors had been
dissolved.1 9 If we assume that he had succeeded to the legal relations
of his grantors though he had knowledge of the plaintiffs' rights, the.
plaintiffs have caused him no loss, because, as we have seen, they have
caused his grantors none.
The other element the court requires for an election is inconsistent
remedies. Assuming the defendants suffered detriment here, were the
remedies sought so inconsistent that resort to one would bar the other?
Since the plaintiffs brought only one action against Frederickson, it is
difficult to see how they could have asked inconsistent remedies against
him. But if we presume that he took the rights of his grantors, the
question is then whether, although- perhaps inconsistent at common
law,2 0 an action for damages, an injunction and a receiver with an
averment that the legal title is in the defendants is under the code incon-
sistent with an action for the declaration of a trust and other relief.
The court says that one is an action at law and the other a bill in equity.
appeal of order vacating arrest); Lewis v. Powell (ii8, Tex. Civ. App.) 2o5 S.
W. 737 (expenses of setting aside earlier sale held not loss); Navajo-Apache
Bank & Trust Co. v. Desmont (1918) i Ariz. 335, 17o Pac. 798 (plaintiff
successively brought and dismissed, before finally suing for an accounting,
actions to restrain the sale of property, to replevy it, and to recover damages for
its conversion) ; Mansfield v. Pickwick Stages, Northern Div., Inc. (1923) 191
Calif. 129, 215 Pac. 389 (expense of preparing motion for change of venue held
not loss). See also McMahan v. McMahon, supra note 17; Cowan v. Young
(1920) 282 Mo. 36, 22o S. W. 869; Freeman v. Fehr (1916) 132 Minn. 384, 157
N. W. 587.
" Cf. Roullard v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co., supra note 13; Crutcher v. Eaves,
supra, note 13.
"0 "It is apparent that the measure of consistency required of a litigant in any
jurisdiction must depend a good deal on the character of its rules of procedure.
The doctrine of election is inherited from the inexorable logic of the formulary
system of the common law. Modern procedure, more or less libellary in
character, sacrifices consistency so far as is necessary to the attainment of sub.
stantial justice." Beach, J., in Abbadessa v. Puglisi, supra note i.
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It is only necessary to reply that under the codes there is but one civil
action. No inconsistency can now be predicated on ancient incon-
sistencies between law and equity, because under the reformed proce-
dure-"law" and "equity" do not exist. What then is the inconsistency
between these two suits? Had the plaintiffs brought the same suit
again they could have amended the averment of title in their complaint.
As was said in Columbus Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. National Life Ins. Co.,
21
a case not noticed by the court, "Under the provisions of our Code
equitable and legal.actions may now be united in a single suit. Since
the cause of action was not changed by the plaintiff in the court below,
plaintiff had a perfect, right to amend the prayer of its petition so that
it might ask for damages only." Do the differences in the form of
relief demanded make the actions inconsistent? Aside from the obvious
points of resemblance between the two prayers, it may be observed that
few rules are better established in code pleading than that the prayer
for relief is immaterial.12 If the plaintiffs had brought the same suit,
they could have amended their demand without difficulty. If they could
bring another action for damages, and then amend the averment of
title and the prayer for relief so that the complaint in that action was
identical with that in their present suit, why should they not be per-
mitted to accomplish the same result directly, that is by bringing their.
present suit? They seek in their present action just what they could
have sought by the more tedious and expensive process of filing their
former complaint and then amending it.
The doctrine of election of remedies was once a mere mechanical
contrivance designed to shut off litigation. Great efforts have been
made, and are made in the decision here commented on, to place it on
higher ground. The aim is to prevent a defendant from being unjustly
subjected to repeated suits. It would seem that the estoppel theory
gives most hope of reaching that result without jeopardizing the rights
of plaintiffs. The dangers of requiring less than estoppel are indicated
by this case. Here, through the application of another rule, the intent
of the codifiers that relief should be granted on the facts proved was
defeated and recovery to defrauded plaintiffs was denied.
RIPARIAN PRIVILEGE OF POLLUTION
In the recent case of Penn. R. R. v. Sagamore Coal Co. (1924, Pa.)
126 Atl. 386, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted an injunction
restraining the defendants from discharging mine waters into a stream
from which the plaintiffs, railroad and water companies, drew their
21 (1919) ioo Ohio St. 20o8, 125 N. E. 664.
ISmith v. Smith (19o3) 67 Kan. 841, 73 Pac. 56; Grand Island Savings &
Loan Assoc. v. Moore (1894) 4o Neb. 686, 59 N. W. 115;. Pomeroy, Code
Remedies (4th ed. 19o4) secs. N1-13.
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water supply. The defendant, relying on Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson,'
contended that the privilege of pollution was a property right which
could not be taken from, them except by condemnation. In that case
the defendant riparian was permitted to pump water out of its mine on
to the land whence it might find its way into the stream even though it
destroyed all the fish in the plaintiff's pond, rendered the water unfit
for use, and so corroded the plaintiff's pipes and machinery as to make
them worthless. This was judicial legislation based upon the supposed
general welfare and public interest as those exist in a coal mining state
like Pennsylvania. Although the character of user was in both cases
the same, the court termed the user in the instant case a "public nui-
sance," as the parties here complaining were not private individuals but
public service companies.
Ownership of land on the banks of a stream gives rise to certain legal
relations which are termed "riparian rights."
12  Thus a lower riparian
has a right that upper riparians restrict their use of the stream to
domestic3 or reasonable industrial4 uses, and a right that non-riparians
1(1886) 113 Pa. 126, 6 AUt. 453.
'French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer (1899) 35 Or. 312, 58 Pac. 1O2; S. 0.
& C. Co. v. Ansonia Water Co. (igio) 83 Conn. 611, 78 Atl. 432. A non-
riparian does not acquire riparian rights by acquiring a license from a riparian
to convey water to his residence. Stoner v. Patten (1909) 132 Ga. 178, 63
S. E. 897. It has been held that a municipality situated on the banks of a stream
may supply its inhabitants whether or not their lots border the stream. City
of Canton v. Shock (1902) 66 Ohio St. ig, 63 N. E. 60o; contra: Stock v. Hills-
dale (1909) 155 Mich. 375, i19 N. W. 435; New Whatconz v. Fairhaven 
Land
Co. (igoi) 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735. See i Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed.
1920) 1138; and see Osborn v. Norwalk (1905) 77 Conn. 663, 60 Ati 645, where
a municipality bought a tract on a stream beyond its corporate limits. 
Owner-
ship of land on navigable streams gives rise to legal relations similar 
to those
accorded a riparian on a non-navigable stream; lbut there can be no 
interference
with the rights of navigation. See Morrill v. Water Power Co. (1879) 26
Minn. 222, 2 N. W. 842; 1 Farnham, Water and Water Rights (19o4) 289.
'A riparian proprietor may even go so far as to exhaust the supply 
of
water when his use is limited to the so-called "domestic" purposes 
(such as
household needs, watering of stock, etc.). Miner v. Gilmour (858) 12 Moore,
P. C. 131; see Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co. 
(igio) 26 S. D. 307,
128 N. W. 596; I Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 1133; cf. Broadinoor
Dairy & Live Stock Co. v. Brookside Water & Inprovement Co. (1897) 24
Colo. 541, 52 Pac. 792. For an attacking view see NoTEs 
(igio) IO Co. L.
REv. 65; 2 Farnham, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 1578.
' Industrial purposes are secondary to domestic uses. Auburn v. Union 
Water
Power Co. (1897) 9o Me. 576, 38 At. 561. User must be reasonable under the
circumstances so as not to infringe upon like privileges of other 
riparians.
Lawrie v. Silsby (9o9) 82 Vt. 505, 74 Atl. 94; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Miller
(1886) 112 Pa. 34, 3 Atl. 780; Lux v. Haggin (1884, Calif.) 4 Pac. gig;
Mentone Irr. Co. v. Redlands Electric Light & Power Co. (i9o9) 155 Calif.
323, ioo Pac. 1O82; Mason v. Whitney (19o6) 193 Mass. 152, 78 N. E. 
881. If
one diverts water from a channel for manufacturing purposes, 
his user is
unreasonable if he causes diminution of flow by not returning that 
which he
does not actually consume. Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co. (1886) 13 Or.
496, 11 Pac. 255.
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in no way interfere with his privilege of user.5 Upper riparians, on
the other hand, have privileges of reasonable user,6 one of which is the
privilege of reasonable pollution. IV John Young &- Co. v. Bankier
Distillery Co.7 the defendant was restrained from pumping mine water
into the stream, which, though pure, rendered the water hard and thus
less suitable for use in the plaintiff's distillery. In Sandusky Portland
Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co.' the defendant used the water in
its factory and returned it so heated that it raised the temperature of
the stream at the plaintiff's land about one-half a degree, thus interfer-
ing with the latter's ice business. Such use was regarded as an unrea-
sonable addition of a foreign element and an injunction was granted.
Yet in Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co.9 it was held that the fouling of
water above the plaintiff's reservoir by the defendant's cattle gave rise
to no right of action, even though the water was thus made unfit for
drinking. If the damage done is slight, no injunction will be issued and
the only recourse is for damages.' fIt is obvious that no rule of thumb
can be laid down to fit all cases of indtistrial pollution."' "Reasonable-
There are a number of cases which permit a riparian to assign his riparian
rights to a non-riparian. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Minneapolis
(i889) 41 Minn. 27o, 43 N. W. 56; Lawrie v. Silsby, supra note 4; cf. Doretus
v. Patterson (1913) 65 N. J. Eq. 711, 55 Atl. 3o4. But the contrary view seems
more widespread. See i Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 1150; NoTEs (i904)
4 Coi L. REV. 431; (i9o2) 16 H.Av. L. Rlv. 145. A riparian may not divert
the water for use on a non-riparian tract. Hopkinsville Bank v. Western
Kentucky Asylun for Insane (19oo) io8 Ky. 357, 56 S. W. 525; Crawford Co.
v. Hathaway (i9o3) 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781. Purchase of a parcel of land
on a stream does not give a town the privilege to divert water for use of
inhabitants on non-riparian land. Gordonsville v. Zinn (192i) 129 Va. 542, io6
S. E. 5o8. For a complete discussion and list of cases, see 14 A. L. R. 33o, note.
'See supra notes 3 and 4. A non-riparian cannot complain of pollution.
City of Newcastle v. Harvey (913) 54 Ind. App. 243, io2 N. E. 878. In some
of the western states the doctrine of prior appropriation of water is applied, but
this is generally restricted to irrigation. Jones v. Adamn (1885) i9 Nev. 78,
6 Pac. 442; Ofield v. Ish (1899) 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 8og. The doctrine has
also been applied in the case of mining operations. Krall v. United States
(1897, C. C. A. 9th) 79 Fed. 41. For an extensive treatment, see Wiel,
"Priority" in Western Water Law (19o9) 18 YALE L AW JOURNAL, i89; (914)
27 HARv. L. REv. 530; (1915) 3 CALIF. L. Ray. 46o; see i Tiffany, op. cit. supra
note 2, at p. 156.
7 [i893, H. L] A. C. 691.
(I9x5, C. C. A. 7th) 221 Fed. 2oo.
° (i8g) 74 Md. 269, 2 Atl. 72.
Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye (88g) 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192; I Farnham, op. cit.
supra note 2, at p. 1701.
' Pollution for mining operations was held unreasonable in the following:
People v. Gold Run Ditch &r Mining Co. (1884) 66 Calif. 138, 4 Pac. 1152;
SUtter County v. Nichols (1908) 152 Calif. 688, 93 Pac. 872; Provolt v. Bailey
(1912) 62 Or. 58, 121 Pac. 96I; see Hill v. Standard Mining Co. (19o6) 12
Idaho, 223, 85 Pac. 9o7; 1o Ann. Cas. 587, note; Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 1o82, note;
22 L. R. A. (N. s.) 28o. To permit such pollution would be taking property
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ness" varies directly with the interests of the community, the size and
without compensation. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.
(1884, C. C. D. Calif.) 18 -Fed. 753.
Unreasonable pollution by factories: Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v.
Frank (199o) 46 Colo. 524, iO5 Pac. 1O93 (poisonous waste matter) ; Horton v.
Fulton (igo8) 13o Ga. 466, 6o S. E. io59 (sawdust); Worthen & Aldrich v.
White Spring Paper Co. (i9o8) 74 N. J. Eq. 647, 7o Atl. 468 (waste fiber and
discoloration) ; Merrifield v. Lombard (1866, Mass.) 13 Allen, 16 (chemicals) ;
H. B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner (19o6) 117 Tenn. 18o, io0 S. W. i16
(chemicals); Tipping v. Eckersley (1855, Ch.) 2 Kay & J. 264 (heat); Shoffner
v. Sutherland (191o) iii Va. 298, 68 S. E. 996 (sawdust) ; see American Tar
Products Co. v. Jones (1920) 17 Ala. App. 481, 86 So. 113; I Tiffany, op. cit.
supra note 2, at p. 1143.
Unreasonable discharge of sewage: Platt Bros. & Co. v. City of Waterbury
(igo7) 8o Conn. 179, 67 At. 508; Mann v. Willey (I9OO, 3d Dept) 51 App. Div.
169, 64 N. Y. Supp. 589; Vogt v. City of Grinnell (19o7) 133 Iowa, 363, 11o
N. W. 6o3; Markwardt v. City of Guthrie (1907) iS Okla. 32, 90 Pac. 26;
Lowe v. Ottaray Mills (1913) 93 S. C. 42o, 77 S. E. 135; see Liessmann, Stream
Water Rights in Illiwis (1912) 6 ILL L. REV. 382 at 387; 41 L. R. A. 751, 753.
Unreasonable miscellaneous uses: Bovnnant v. Huonphrey (19o6) 132 Iowa,
234, IO9 N. W. 714 (dairy refuse); Adams v. Clover Hill Farms (1917) 86 Or.
14o, 167 Pac. 1015 (dairy refuse) ; Barton v. Union Cattle Co. (1889) 28 Neb.
350, 44 N. W. 454 (cattle pens); People v. Elk River Mill Co. ('895) lO7 Calif.
214, 4o Pac. 486 (stable); Durango v. Chapman (I9oo) 27 Colo. i69, 6o Pac.
635 (slaughterhouse). But the following were held reasonable: McEvoy v.
Taylor (9o9) 56 Wash. 357, IO5 Pac. 85, (reasonable number of cattle pas-
tured); People v. Hulbert (I9O2) 131 Mich. 156, 91 N. W. 211 (bathing);
Barnard v. Shirley (1897) 151 Ind. 16o, 47 N. E. 671 (baths at sanitarium).
It makes no difference wliether or not the lower proprietor bought with
knowledge of the pollution. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Grose (19o7) io6 Va.
476, 56 S. E. 22. It is also immaterial that pure water may be procured from
another source. Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal Co. (19o2) 203 Pa. 316, 52 AUt.
2oI. Doubtless the court would have considered this very material in "balanc-
ing the conveniences" had this been an action for an injunction rather than
merely for damages.
The privileges of a municipality are no greater than those of an individual.
Watson v. New Milford (igoo) 72 Conn. 561, 45 At. 167; Doremus v. Patterson,
supra note 5; see Robb v. La Grange (1895) 158 Ill. 21, 42 N. E. 77; 47 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 137, note. Of course a municipality may acquire greater privileges
by exercising its power to condemn for public purposes.
When the pollution becomes a "public nuisance" the privilege ceases and an
injunction will be granted in suit by the state. Corn. v. Kennedy (1913) -o
Pa. 214, 87 Atl. 6o5. Or on suit by an individual who has suffered special
damage. Hoyt v. McLaughlin (911) 250 Ill. 442, 95 N. E. 464; Arizona Copper
Co, v. Gillespie (1913) 230 U. S. 46, 33 Sup. Ct OO4. An individual may also
recover damages. Kraver v. Snith (1915) 164 Ky. 674, 177 S. W. 286; Platt
Bros. & Co. v. Waterbury, supra. 'The privilege to pollute more than is ordi-
narily reasonable may be acquired by prescription. Jones V. Crow (1859) 32
Pa. 398; Masonic Temple Assoc. v. Harris (1887) 79 Me. 250, 9 AUt. 737; see
Brookline v. Mackintosh (1882) 133 Mass. 215; I Farnham, op. cit. supra note
2, at p. 17o6; Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 182, note. But not so as to a "public nuisance,"
Kraver v. Smith, supra; Attorney General v. Grand Rapids (1913) 175 Mich.
503, 141 N. W. 890.
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nature of the stream, custom and usage, and the reaction of the court
in the particular case."2
The Sanderson case held that a pollution, practically the same in char-
acter as that in the instant case, was privileged as against a single
riparian proprietor severely damaged. Would that decision have been
otherwise if all the lower proprietors had joined the plaintiff in his suit?
It seems not and that the theory of the case was that the defendant
therein was legally privileged to pollute the stream as against all riparian
owners alike. A dictum in that case'3 did indicate, however, that the
pollution might become a "nuisance" to the public and that in such a
case the privilege would cease. It was on that dictum that the court
in the instant case relied. But the attachment of the appellation "public
nuisance" to a user has hitherto been regarded as dependent not upon
the plurality of parties complaining of individual special damage, but
rather on the general damage common to all.' 4
The present decision probably carries the rule of the dictum in the
Sanderson case farther than was intended, but the Pennsylvania court
has already indicated15 that the actual decision in that case was not to
be extended, and that it was ripe for limitation. It was once thought
that the only public advantage of a. public user of water over a private
user lies in the power to take by condemnation. The present case holds
in effect that the privilege of user is less as against public users of water
than it is as against private users. This also may be a sound distinction;
but there lies in it the possibility of taking property without compen-
sation. However that may be, the further limitation of the rule in
the Sanderson case should be welcomed, and we may expect its total
abandonment eventually.
'In Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson (i886) 133 Pa. at p. i49, 6 Atl. at p. 459,
Clark, J., said: "To encourage the development of the great natural resources
of a country, trifling inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give
way to the necessities of a great community." See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298, at p. 381; Mason v. Whitney (i9o6)
193 Mass. 152, 78 N. E. 881; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. (19oo) 164 N. Y. 3o3,
58 N. E. 142; Driscoll v. Alerican Hide & Leather Co. (1918, Sup. Ct.) 102
Misc. 612, 17o N. Y. Supp. 121; cf. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. (1895)
54 N. J. Eq. 65, 33 AtI. 286.
"'We do not say that a case may not arise in which a stream, from such
pollution, may be regarded as a public nuisance, and that the public interest...
may not require the abatement of that nuisance." 113 Pa. at p. 149, 6 Atl. at
P- 459.
"King v. Morris & Essex Ry. (1867) i8 N. J. Eq. 397; Smith v. City of
Sedalia (1899) 152 Mo. 283, 53 S. W. 907; see Wood, Law of Nuisances
(1875) 29.
Com. v. Rusell (1896) 172 Pa. 5o6, 33 Atl. 709; Coin. v. REniers (igog)
221 Pa. 298, 70 Atl. 762.
